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Value Creation in a
Credit Card Portfolio
A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN
DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN
In these times of upheaval in the banking in-
dustry, managers are increasingly likely to ques-
tion whether their business units create value
for shareholders. Industry analysts have argued
that once a bank identifies pieces of its retail sec-
tor which add or dilute value for its sharehold-
ers, it can forge a strategy for each business unit
that has a good chance of succeeding.! However,
measuring the shareholder-value-creation po-
tential of a business unit or product forces the
retail banker to think about performance in new
and sometimes confusing ways. Traditional mea-
sures of performance do not correlate with mar-
ket value measures. High interest rate margins
and earnings per share do not necessarily add up
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to high stock prices. As the standards for perfor-
mance measurement in banking shift to return
on equity, adjusted for risk, bankers are discov-
ering "some fascinating facts about their busi-
ness mix."2
The purpose of this analysis is to discover the
"facts" about the mix of behavioral types in a
credit card portfolio and the way mix impacts
shareholder value." We disaggregated the port-
folio of standard credit cards of a large regional
bank into segments which are defined in terms of
the way the cards were used in 1988. The annual
profitability of each segment, measured in terms
of after-tax return on equity, is estimated. In ad-
dition, the performance of a small sample of pre-
mium cards is analyzed. The analysis provides
insights into the "value drivers" in the portfolio
and the value-creation potential of new-card
marketing and pricing programs.
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Ifmanagers want to determine the value creat-
ed by a particular lending function, they esti-
mate its incremental cash flows, the amount of
the shareholders' investment, and the share-
holders' required rate of return. With these data,
the managers can determine shareholder value,
which is net present value minus allocated cap-
ital.
Leemputte and Kearney describe a process for
estimating the break-up value or net present val-
ue of an existing retail banking business unit.
Another method for analyzing the value creation
aspects of a lending activity is to estimate the
risk-adjusted rate of return on equity capital in-
vested. The amount of equity invested is that re-
quired to shield the lender from unexpected
losses in the loan portfolio, losses that are not
provided for by the regular loss reserve. The
capital allocation for unexpected losses may
vary across segments of a loan portfolio and can
greatly exceed the bank's overall capital-to-as-
sets ratio.
In this analysis of the risk-adjusted return on
equity of a standard credit card portfolio, the
portfolio was divided into segments defined in
terms of the way the cards were used during the
year, the size of credit lines, and the age of the
accounts. For each segment, total gross income
was determined by summing the actual total in-
terest paid during the year, all annual fees, in-
terchange income, and delinquency and overli-
mit charges paid by each account.
Interest and noninterest charges for servicing
the accounts were deducted from total gross in-
come. Both charges were estimated as a percent-
age of the average balance of each account dur-
ing the year. The interest expense was set equal
to 8%, the-average two-year constant-maturity
Treasury bond rate during the analysis year
(1988). In the calculation, the interest expense
charged to each account was adjusted to reflect
the fact that the account was partially funded by
interest-free equity.
Pricing Covers Average Losses
For banks of comparable asset size, total oper-
ating expenses for the credit card function were
5%of outstandings in 1988. This figure was used
in the estimation of operating expenses attribut-
able to each account in the portfolio. Also sub-
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tracted from gross income were actual char-
geoffs in 1988. The result of these calculations is
cash income before taxes.
Theoretically, loans will be priced high enough
to allow the lender to cover his expected char-
geoffs. The role of the equity capital is to protect
the lender from unexpected losses for given
types of loans. Prudent credit risk management
procedures require that the lender underwrite
each loan type or segment of the portfolio with
capital equal to a measure of unexpected losses
for the relevant class of loans. Following the
methodology described by Rose, we set the capi-
tal allocation for each segment of the portfolio
based on the standard deviation of the distribu-
tion of actual chargeoff losses for that segment.
Due to data limitations, the amount of unexpect-
ed losses was based on experience for only one
year. Ideally, the unexpected loss risk would be
measured over a number of years.
The Benefits of Diversification
This capital allocation does not define the op-
timal leverage for a bank seeking to satisfy the
"worst case" requirement for equity funding.
Rose argued that if loan losses were distributed
normally, the allocation of risk capital equal to
two standard deviations of losses would cover
the bank against unexpected losses about 98% of
the time, provided the future replicated the past.
But two times the standard deviation of loan
losses may overestimate unexpected losses since
losses across various segments are probably not
perfectly correlated. Given the extent of geo-
graphic and demographic diversification in most
credit card portfolios, we would allocate capital
equal to one standard deviation of the mean loss
experience.
In the final calculation of the after-tax return
on equity, the average income earned for each
segment of the portfolio was adjusted by a 40%
tax factor and divided by the allocated capital
amount for that segment. The resulting risk-ad-
justed rate of return was then compared with
the hurdle rate of the bank to determine whether
the business justified tying up shareholders'
funds. We assumed that the after-tax hurdle rate
for bank equity in 1988 was 15%.
The analysis was performed using a sample of
credit card accounts randomly selected from the
population of active accounts in the portfolio of
a large midwestern commercial bank. The port-
folio contained accounts representing house-
holds from every region of the country but was
concentrated in the Midwest. The data base in-
cluded the date the account was opened and all
account activity for 1988. All accounts included
in the sample were open before 1988 and were
active during the year, but could have been
closed or charged off by year end. Segments of
the portfolio were defined in terms of how the
accounts had been used in 1988.
Incorporating Delinquencies
While the allocation of risk capital for each
segment of the card portfolio was derived from
an assessment of the risk of unexpected loss in
that segment, or the standard deviation of the
distribution of 1988 charged-off dollars, other
more traditional measures of account risk were
included in the summary statistics for each seg-
ment but were not included in the calculation of
net income for each segment.
These risk measures were (a) percent delin-
quent - the proportion of the 1988 account life in
which a payment was past due for at least 30
days; average value for all accounts, and (b) per-
cent overlimit - the percent of the 1988 account
life in which an outstanding balance exceeded
the approved line of credit; average value for all
accounts in the segment.
Measures of account activity provided for
each segment were the average percent of the to-
tal credit line used during the year (1988 aver-
age balance/credit line), and the average percent
of the 1988 account life that a balance was
revolved.
Institutional Pricing. The method by which the
cards are priced obviously has a profound im-
pact on the rate-of-return analysis. The pricing
schedule for this portfolio was similar to that for
the bulk of bank credit cards outstanding in
1988. The majority of the accounts were stan-
dard Visa and MasterCard cards with an annual
fee of $12 or $15 and an annual percentage rate
of 16.8% on cash advances and 19.8% on mer-
chandise purchases. The issuer provided a 30-
day grace period on all merchandise purchases,
but not on cash advances. The premium cards in
the sample had an adjustable interest rate with
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an annual fee of $35. For all accounts, the late
fee and the overlimit fee were $10 per incident.
In the analysis, the merchant interchange fee
was 1.3% of total merchandise purchases.
The Return on Equity for the Portfolio. The
bank credit card industry defined its profitabili-
ty targets for credit card portfolios in terms of
the after-tax return on assets. The American
Bankers Association's 1989 Credit Card Report
indicated that medium-size banks ($300 million
to $1 billion in assets) had an average after-tax
return-on-assets target of 1.2%, while banks
above $1 billion in assets set that target at
3.11%. Others have estimated that commercial
banks had an after-tax hurdle rate of return on
equity of 15% to 20% during 1988. At a tax rate
of 40%, the portfolio analyzed here produced an
after-tax return on assets of 2.58% and an after-
tax return on equity (ROE) of 12.05%.
The disappointing level of equity returns is di-
rectly attributable to the large capital allocation
for unexpected losses, which equaled 35% of av-
erage account balances - a staggering yet, for
this year, a correct figure. Most banks would, of
course, require less equity and therefore may
have acceptably profitable returns. In this year,
however, the portfolio was not creating share-
holder value for this institution. Let us now pro-
ceed to an analysis of the profitability of dis-
crete segments of the portfolio.
Value Creation - Revolvers vs. Convenience
Users. Most cards are priced so that the card-
holder may avoid paying interest if the entire
balance is paid within the grace period. Thus,
only those cardholders who actually revolve a
balance pay interest. The profitability of a credit
card portfolio depends vitally on the mix of re-
volvers and nonrevolvers. In 1988, 58.'5% of this
sample paid interest at some time during the
year. This is comparable to industry figures that
indicate that about 60% of account holders in
1988 revolved.
The standard accounts in the sample were seg-
mented into four groups based on the proportion
of times the balance was revolved in 1988. (See
Table 1.) While it is desirable to increase revolv-
er activity from an income-generating point of
view, the data in Table 1 indicate that all mea-
sures of credit risk increase in proportion to the
amount of time a customer revolves. And, as
would be expected, the amount of allocated capi-
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Table 1: Card Use Performance of Customers, Classified According to Per-
cent of Time Revolving
Characteristic Percent of 1988 Account Life Revolved
0 1-25% 26-75 % >75%
% Credit Line Used 6.2 9.0 19.4 51.7
% Of 1988 Account Life Revolved 0 14.2 52.9 98.1
% 1988 Account Life Delinquent 1.6 ~.9 5.1 13.1
% 1988 Account Life Overlimit 0.3 0.1 1.1 5.6
% Accounts Charged Off in 1988 1.1 0 2.1 2.5
Standard Deviation of $ Char-
~eoffs 127.04 0 201.96 306.7
efore-Tax Net Income $ 7.91 16.11 30.87 92.42
After-Tax Return on Equity % 3.75 NA 9.17 18.08
N= 7528, Arithmetic Mean Values
tal required to hedge against unexpected losses,
which is the standard deviation of chargeoff
losses, also increases as the accounts are more
heavily revolved. However, only the heavy-re-
volver segment of the portfolio (more than 75%
percent of the year) produced sufficient cash
flow to justify the capital required, given the
risk of the segment. (The allocated capital for
the second group was zero because there were no
chargeoffs, eliminating the possibility for calcu-
lating a ROE.However, average income for these
accounts was positive.) The performance mea-
sure for the other two segments indicates that
shareholder value is actually being destroyed,
given the current pricing strategy for credit
cards.
The analysis of return on equity suggests a
need for repricing credit card services for nonre-
volvers. Many in the industry would argue that
the activity of the nonrevolver reduces the aver-
age cost of all transactions, generating higher
profitability for the entire portfolio. Some might
argue that the nonrevolver account is also a low-
cost account to service because of its limited
bad-debt and collection expenses. However, the
average balance for the nonrevolver segment
was only one-eighth the size of that of the heavy-
revolver segment. As the operating costs were
assigned in proportion to average balances, the
ROE figures for each segment already incorpo-
rate the operating costs that are associated with
the nonrevolving segment.
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Ways to increase nonrevolver profitability in-
clude raising the annual fee, assessing a per-
transaction charge, increasing the interchange
rate, and eliminating the grace period. In the cur-
rent competitive environment, none of these al-
ternatives would seem palatable. But if share-
holder-value creation is the objective,
nonrevolvers must either be shifted to debit
cards (with lower unexpected losses) or charged
fees high enough to reduce their drag on overall
profitability
Value Creation - High-Balance Revolvers. The
previous analysis argues for the targeting of ac-
tive revolvers to improve the value-creating po-
tential. But some banks have identified card-
holders who revolve a large percentage of their
credit line as high-risk and have thus terminated
such accounts. To assess the validity of such a
strategy in a risk-adjusted-return framework,
accounts that revolved a balance more than 75%
of the time were segmented into two groups -
those that revolved less than one-half of their
available -credit line and those that revolved
more than half. (See Table 2.)
All measures of credit risk were dramatically
higher for the "high-balance revolver." The cap-
ital allocation for this segment was more than 10
times higher than that for the low-balance re-
volver, while the income derived from the high-
balance revolver was only 50% greater .. Never-
theless, the ROE for the high-balance revolver
was acceptable.
It is clear from these data that efforts to re-
duce loss uncertainty from high-balance revolv-
ers, perhaps through closer monitoring of credit
limits, should improve risk-adjusted profitabili-
ty. However, indiscriminate termination of these
accounts is probably not a good idea.
The Risk-Adjusted Return on Premium Cards.
Premium credit cards were an important innova-
tion of the last five years. These cards generally
offer a high credit limit, a relatively low or ad-
justable interest rate, and a high annual fee rela-
tive to that charged for standard bank cards.
One would expect credit standards to be stricter
for premium cards, and the lower interest rate
should be attractive to those intending to use the
card for credit, not convenience. As a result, the
premium card segment should produce a high
risk-adjusted rate of return.
The performance of the premium accounts in
the sample was compared with that for standard
accounts with similarly high credit lines ($5,000
or more). The summary statistics are presented
in Table 3. As expected, premium cardholders
were more likely to revolve a balance and used a
higher percentage of the available credit line
than did standard cardholders. However, all the
risk measures for the premium cards exceeded
those for the standard ones, and the standard de-
viation of losses was more than twice as high.
The risk-adjusted return on equity for the premi-
um card was well below the hurdle rate (only
Table 2: Differences in Card Use Performance
Between "High-Balance" and "Low-Balance"
High Revolvers
Characteristic
Accounts Revolving> 75%
of 1988 Account Life,
Average Balance as
Percentage of Credit Line
<50% >50%
% Credit Line Used
% of 1988 Account Life Revolved
% 1988Account Life Delinquent
% 1988Account Life Overlimit
% Accounts Charged off in 1988
StandardDeviation of $ Chargeoffs
Before-Tax Net Income $
After-Tax Return on Equity %
N=2346, Arithmetic Mean Values
28.4
97.0
5.3
0.4
0.4
35.71
72.94
122.55
72.3
99.2
19.6
10.0
3.8
397
106.72
16.01
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9%). In contrast, standard accounts with large
credit lines provided a return that was above the
hurdle rate (nearly 17%).
The inferior performance of the premium card
program may be attributed to a difference in the
age of accounts. Banks generally do not offer a
high credit line to a standard cardholder unless
he is a very good credit risk or is a long-standing
customer. The low credit risk measures in the
standard card segment may simply reflect the ef-
fects of account aging. In fact, the average age of
the premium accounts was 19 months, while that
for the standard high-balance accounts was 64
months.
Thus, while the ROE for the premium cards
was disappointing, it is possible that a portfolio
of "aged" premium cards might be as profitable
as one of standard cards with high credit lines.
The following section provides more information
on the relationship between the age of the ac-
count and profitability.
Risk-Adjusted Returns by Age of Account.
Card issuers have generally observed a relation-
Table 3: Comparison of Premium and Standard
Cardholders with Lines of Over $5,000
Characteristic Premium Standard
% Revolve
% Credit Line Used
% of 1988 Account Life Revolved
% of 1988 Account Life Delinquent
% 1988 Account Life Overlimit
% Accounts Charged Off in 1988
Standard Deviation of $ Chargeoffs
Before-Tax Net Income $
After-Tax Return on Equity %
Number
72.3
26.2
50.0
6.7
1.0
1.0
381.29
57.33
9.0
329
44.9
14.5
22.0
2.9
0.3
0.9
163.62
45.71
16.76
363
Arithmetic Mean Values
ship between account age and the incidence of
credit difficulty. Lenders expect delinquency
rates for new accounts to peak in their second
year. To isolate the impact of account age, the
portfolio was segmented into four groups on the
basis of age of account and age of cardholder.
Accounts for cardholders aged 26 to 55 - stable
and high-credit-using types - were divided into
four groups, as shown in Table 4.
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Tible 4: 'erformlnce of Cardholders Aged 26 to 55, by Age of Account
Age of Account
Characteristics <12 Months 13-24 Months 25-60 Months >60 Months
% Revolw 59.7 78.4 70.7 72.5
% Credit LiM UMd· 30.3 37.0 30.2 27.8
% of 1'" Accoutlt L.iflRevolved 27.0 57.8 49.8 48.1
% 1918 Account Life Delinquent 10.0 11.1 9.3 5.5
% Account LiM CNlrlimit 5.9 7.0 3.3 1.6
% Accounts Charged Off in 1988 2.6 4.8 2.5 0.4
Standard Deviation of $ Char-
geoffs. 127.08 349.16 277.52 103.71
Before-Tax Net Incomt $ 6.42 41.14 44.42 47.50
After-Tax ReMn on Equity % 3.03 7.07 9.61 27.36
N=2128, ArithmetiC Mean Values
All measures of risk peak at the 13-to-24
month age group, including the measure of unex-
pected losses. The risk-adjusted return in-
creased with account age but did not exceed the
hurdle rate until the accounts were more than 60
months old.
These data suggest the high~return potential
of programs for retaini~ existing accounts. In
their concentration on JM)rtfctlio growth through
new account 8OlieitatiOtt;eaHiHuers have, in all
likelihood, dramatically redUted their return on
equity. In contrast, those who cultivated their
existing accounts may have created more share-
holder value, albeit with lower portfolio growth.
Note that the increased value of the mature ac-
count derives primarily from the lower amount
of equity required to hedge unexpected losses. In
an analysis of commercial loans, Rose found that
investment-grade "blue chip" loans provided the
highest return on equity for a similar reason.
The objective of bank managers is to create
shareholder value in each product or function of
the bank. Todoless is to invite failure. However,
most managers are not accustomed to measuring
the value-creating potential of bank products.
Using a methodology described by Rose, we cal-
culated the risk-adjusted after-tax return on eq-
uity for segments of a credit card portfolio.
While the overall portfolio provided an attrac-
tive return on assets, the return on allocated eq-
uity was below the hurdle rate, probably be-
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cause the variance of losses in this particular
year was unusually high.
Segmentation of the portfolio provided evi-
dence that, on average, accounts that did not re-
volve a balance at least 75% of the time de-
stroyed shareholder value. However, among
high revolvers, those who revolved less than
half their credit lines were sensationally profit-
able, while those revolving more than half their
lines exceeded the bank's hurdle rate by only one
point. Further, premium cards earned a return
well below the average for the portfolio and dra-
matically lower than the return provided by
standard cards with similarly high credit limits.
The weak performance of the premium card seg-
ment appeared to reflect the low average age of
accounts. Our final segmentation revealed that
the risk-adjusted return increased with the age
of the account, but was above the hurdle rate
only for those accounts that were more than five
years old.
The analysis demonstrates that the strategy of
offering large credit lines at low fees and rates to
cardholders who have not absolutely demon-
strated their creditworthiness causes high unex-
pected losses without offsetting incomegrowth.
But programs designed to retain existing ac-
counts are likely to add considerable value to the
portfolio. This profitability analysis does not
provide justification for cracking down on those
who revolve a high percentage of their lines
most of the time.
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To build value, credit card portfolio managers
must consider the implications of their strate-
gies for both income and unexpected losses. As
all credit card portfolios are not the same, the re-
sults of this analysis may not be generalizable,
but the value of the insights gained is clear.
Notes
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Chips." American Banker, Jan. 30, 1991, p.l
3. Michael C. Lenora. "Segmenting Credit Cardholders by
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19-23, contains a discussion of behavioral types in a credit
card portfolio.
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